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ABSTRACT
The Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme is a
program whereby Aboriginal community councils receive grants
roughly equivalent to the social security entitlements of community
members which are used as wages for the creation of jobs. It has been
operating since 1977, during which time it has expanded to include 169
participating communities and involve 18,266 Aboriginal people.
Expenditure on CDEP for 1990/91 totalled about $194 million,
representing 36 per cent of the Aboriginal affairs portfolio expenditure.
This paper focuses on the nature of some unresolved administrative and
policy issues relating to the CDEP scheme. Many of these issues stem
from the development of the CDEP scheme as both a welfare and a
workforce program with the differing policy directions, funding needs
and administrative requirements that this entails. The appropriate balance
between income support or welfare and employment development or
workforce objectives in the scheme may appear unachievable, but the
intractable and structural nature of Aboriginal unemployment in many
situations makes the scheme worthy of close attention by policy makers.
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The Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme,
administered since March 1990 by the new Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commission (ATSIC) and formerly by the Commonwealth
Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA), is a program whereby
incorporated bodies in Aboriginal communities receive grants roughly
equivalent to what was until July 1991 the unemployment benefit
entitlement of community members, rather than having individuals
receiving these benefits directly. 1 Grants are used by participating
community councils as wages for the creation of jobs in community
development activities which, through the offer of work, are supposed to
provide individuals with income roughly equivalent to that to which they
would otherwise be entitled from the Department of Social Security
(DSS).
The CDEP scheme was introduced on a pilot basis for remote Aboriginal
communities by the Eraser Coalition Government in 1977. Aborigines in
these communities were at that time only just coming to be regarded as
eligible for unemployment benefits (UB) (Sanders 1985). There was,
among those involved in Aboriginal affairs policy at that time,
considerable concern that large scale payment of UB in these communities
would be both unproductive and cause considerable social problems
(DAA 1976; Coombs 1977). Something along the lines of the CDEP
scheme seemed the obvious alternative.
Twelve communities participated in the CDEP scheme initially and
several more sought participation. However, the scheme experienced
severe budgetary and administrative problems during its early years and
expanded only once, from 12 to 18 communities and from 800 to 1,300
participants, during the late 1970s. It then remained frozen at these levels
of commitment during the early 1980s, while the payment of UB to
Aborigines in other remote communities gradually spread (Sanders
1985). Then, in 1983, the budgetary and administrative problems of the
CDEP scheme appeared finally to be resolved. The scheme began
expanding and, in the process, started taking over from the DSS payment
of UB. By 1985/86, the CDEP scheme involved 38 remote Aboriginal
communities and 4,000 participants.2 (For a more detailed account of
these years see Sanders 1988.)
In 1986 and 1987, the CDEP scheme became a central part of the Hawke
Government's new Aboriginal Employment Development Policy (AEDP).
Targets anticipating 1,600 new CDEP participants per annum over the
next five years were set, as more remote Aboriginal communities joined
the scheme. The scheme was also to have its 'flexibility' increased by,
among other measures, extending coverage to a wider range of
Aboriginal community types and 'other situations where Aboriginal
people have no alternative employment prospects' (Australian
Government 1987a: 6). This seemed to leave open the possibility that the
CDEP scheme would be introduced to Aboriginal communities in more
settled areas of southern and eastern Australia, as indeed it was over the
next three years.
Table 1. CDEP expenditure and participants, 1976/77 to
1990/91.
Year Communities
participating
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1
10
12
17
18
18
18
32
33
38
63
92
129
166
169
Participants
(workers)
100
500
800
700
1,300
1,300
1,300
•1,700
2,900
4,000
6,000
7,600
10,800
13,800
18,266
CDEP CDEP as % of
expenditure Aboriginal affairs
($ million) portfolio expenditure
0.1
2.0
2.9
3.8
6.9
7.0
7.4
14.2
23.5
27.2
39.5
65.5
98.8
133.2
194.1
0.1
1.6
2.1
2.7
4.3
4.1
3.7
5.8
8.3
9.2
11.9
17.4
22.0
25.0
35.8
Sources: Sanders (1988); CDEP Working Party (1990); Morony (1991); Economic
Initiatives Branch, ATSIC.
Growth of the CDEP scheme to mid 1990 outstripped even the ambitious
targets set for it in the AEDP. The scheme increased to 169 communities
and 18,000 participants, of which 32 new communities involving
approximately 1,658 new participants were in the more settled south-
eastern States of New South Wales and Victoria, both in country towns
and in large urban areas. The CDEP scheme went from accounting for
9.2 per cent of the expenditure of the Aboriginal affairs portfolio in
1985/86 to 25 per cent in 1989/90 (see Table 1). In the 1990/91 financial
year, expenditure on the CDEP scheme totalled $194 million, which
accounts for 36 per cent of ATSIC's expenditure. The expansion of the
scheme since 1987/88 has, however, now slowed considerably.
From late 1989 and early 1990, the CDEP scheme and its recent rapid
expansion came under renewed scrutiny. In its 1989 report on the DAA's
financial statement, the Australian National Audit Office expressed
concern that the Department could not verify that CDEP payments were,
in every instance, being made to recipients who were entitled to them
(DAA 1989: 241). As a result, the Audit Office undertook a more
detailed study of the CDEP scheme during late 1989 and most of 1990
(Auditor-General 1990). At much the same time, the DAA, with the
backing of the Hawke Government, initiated its own review of the CDEP
scheme's 'funding and administration' (CDEP Working Party 1990). This
review drew together representatives of several Commonwealth
government departments and two outside consultants.3 Their report was
completed in February 1990, some months ahead of the Audit Office
report, and called for a 'breathing space' in further expansion of the
CDEP scheme to allow numerous unresolved 'policy and administrative
issues' to be addressed (CDEP Working Party 1990: vi). The Hawke
Government was quick to endorse this idea during its 1990/91 budget
deliberations and indicated that no new communities beyond the existing
166 were to be admitted to the CDEP scheme.4 The Audit Office report,
published in November 1990, also identified a number of 'key areas for
attention' (Auditor-General 1990: vii). While the moratorium on the
CDEP scheme's expansion to new communities has been lifted in the
1991/1992 budget context, it seems likely that the expansion of the scheme
in the immediate future will be more measured.5
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the nature of the unresolved
administrative and policy problems which brought expansion of the
CDEP scheme so abruptly to a halt in mid-1990. In so doing we are
mindful of the fact that from July 1991 UB ceased to exist and was
replaced, under the Hawke Government's new Active Employment
Strategy, by Job Search Allowance and Newstart. We are also mindful of
the fact that the Hawke Government has committed itself to a major
independent review of the first five years of the AEDP in 1993
(Australian Government 1987b: 16). Both these events will present
opportunities for addressing the unresolved administrative and policy
issues relating to the CDEP scheme and for charting the scheme's future.
It is, therefore, an appropriate time to spell out the nature of those
unresolved issues in order to inform debate.
Both welfare and workforce program
The root cause of many of the unresolved administrative and policy issues
which surround the CDEP scheme is that it attempts to be both a welfare
and a workforce program. It attempts to provide participants with income
support roughly equivalent to their entitlements from the social security
system, while at the same time promoting employment and community
development objectives. These different objectives push the scheme
towards different funding and administrative arrangements and in
different policy directions. They involve the scheme in a number of
dilemmas which, although they have been managed and contained over the
years of the scheme's existence, seem never entirely to go away.
Funding and administrative arrangements
The budgetary and administrative problems which plagued the CDEP
scheme during the late 1970s and early 1980s related primarily to the fact
that, unlike UB and other social security programs, the CDEP scheme did
not have an open-ended annual budget allocation. This made it difficult
for the DAA to operate the scheme as anything like an equivalent to UB
and exposed the Department to considerable pressure and criticism from
participating community councils who frequently claimed that their
budget allocations were not sufficient to provide a UB alternative. From
1983, these problems appeared to be resolved when the DAA was granted
an open-ended budgetary status for the CDEP scheme. The quid pro quo
for this, however, was that participants in the scheme would, henceforth,
have to be individually identified on a schedule regularly submitted to the
DAA by participating communities. The notional UB entitlement of
individuals would then be calculated to determine the amount of a
community's grant. This had not occurred in previous years when
participants in a community's CDEP had not been individually identified
and grant levels had been determined merely by estimating numbers of
participants and multiplying by an average notional UB entitlement.
From 1983, the DAA attempted to implement an administrative system
for the CDEP scheme which regularly identified individual participants
and precisely calculated their notional UB entitlement. The task, however,
proved beyond the DAA's administrative resources and capabilities,
particularly once the scheme started to expand rapidly in the wake of the
AEDP. The organisational structure of the DAA was essentially geared to
making discretionary grants to incorporated community associations or to
State government agencies on an annual, or at most quarterly, basis. It
had neither the ability nor the resources to handle the large amount of
frequent information collection and data processing involved in an
individualised, entitlement-type program. As a result the 1990 CDEP
Working Party suggested, in their review, that the scheme change to a
simpler form of funding and administration in which participants would
still be individually identified, but only on a quarterly basis, and that the
level of grant be calculated on the basis of an average UB entitlement,
rather than an exact reckoning of individual entitlement (CDEP Working
Party 1990: 20-6). The review also suggested that the DSS take over the
operation and management of these simplified arrangements for the
CDEP scheme's participant review schedules, and perhaps even the
processes of payment (CDEP Working Party 1990: 29-32). This indicates
just how difficult the DAA's had found the management of an
individualised schedule system in the years since 1983.
The idea of transferring administrative responsibility for the CDEP
scheme's participant review schedules to the DSS foundered, in the wake
of the 1990 review, primarily because of ATSIC's view that it was
inappropriate for the DSS to take such a role with respect of an ATSIC
program. ATSIC, which inherited the scheme from the DAA, continues
to administer the participant schedules itself and has recently reverted to
average notional unemployment benefit entitlement as the basis of grant
calculation. It has also cut back to a quarterly frequency for schedule
submission. These newly introduced administrative arrangements may, in
time, prove to be an adequate way of balancing the need to be able to
identify individual participants in the scheme, so that some fairly precise
link with a notional social security entitlement is maintained, and ATSIC's
lack of capacity and resources to administer a precise social security-type
program. The new arrangements may, however, also expose the CDEP
scheme to other criticisms, such as those relating to marginal eligibility
differences with social security entitlements.
Marginal eligibility differences
Marginal eligibility differences arise because of the inexact equivalence
between the CDEP scheme and UB, or those payments under Job Search
Allowance and Newstart that have now taken over from it. Logically,
these differences fall into two categories: those where CDEP participants
are seen as having a marginal eligibility advantage or a disadvantage in
comparison with social security recipients. In the past, there have been
examples of both such types of marginal eligibility differences becoming
issues for the administration of the CDEP scheme.
One example of eligibility advantage for CDEP participants, which was at
the centre of the 1990 review, was the possibility of a double payment of
both Additional Unemployment Benefit (AB) and Family Allowance
Supplement (FAS) to CDEP participants. Whereas AB was available to
unemployment beneficiaries for the support of dependent children, FAS
was available, at a similar rate, to low income workers. Normally the two
are mutually exclusive. However, CDEP grants of recent years have
included in their calculations equivalents of participants' notional AB
entitlements, while at the same time many CDEP participants have been
applying for, and receiving, FAS as low income workers. The CDEP
Working Party estimated that on a state-by-state basis between 46 per cent
(Victoria) and 96 per cent (Queensland) of 'eligible' CDEP participants
were receiving FAS (CDEP Working Party 1990: 33-6) thereby creating
a notional double payment. Funding for the CDEP scheme in the wake of
the 1990 review was not reduced in the light of this double dipping.
Nevertheless, ATSIC was put on notice that henceforth CDEP participants
would be expected to apply for FAS directly, and that future expansions
of the level of CDEP funding would not include an allowance for
additional UB entitlement.
The 1990 CDEP Working Party also noted that on the side of eligibility
disadvantage, CDEP grants of recent years had not included any amounts
for the rental assistance normally available to unemployment beneficiaries
who rent accommodation other than from public housing authorities
(CDEP Working Party 1990: 42). No estimates of this effective
underpayment were made by the 1990 working party, though they would
clearly at least have partially offset the FAS double payment. Both these
examples of marginal eligibility problems will, however, become
somewhat less obvious now that the calculation of CDEP grants has gone
across to an average, rather than precise, social security equivalent.
Another marginal eligibility problem which disadvantages, rather than
advantages, CDEP participants is that, as very low income workers, these
participants would, under the normal social security income test,
frequently be eligible for part-payment of benefit in addition to their
wage. Cass (1988: 251) was the first to point out this marginal eligibility
difference, and since then it has become more widely recognised.
Previously it had been assumed that because CDEP participants had
already notionally received a UB payment, in the form of their CDEP
wage, they were unable to apply for partial UB. However, now that this
particular marginal eligibility difference has become more widely
appreciated, there is a possibility that CDEP participants will apply to
DSS for their partial benefit entitlements and that the DSS will feel
obliged to pay under the provision of its legislation (Auditor-General
1990: 14). What this would mean for the notional offset of CDEP grants
against social security entitlements is entirely unclear.
One other example falling on the side of marginal eligibility advantage
for CDEP participants, has been that those involved in the scheme who
earn casual income above and beyond their CDEP wage have not, in the
past, faced income testing for additional earnings and gradual withdrawal
of payment, as they would were they in fact receiving a social security
payment. This anomaly has been acknowledged by ATSIC which now
places a limit on additional earnings for CDEP participants and requires
the completion of covering certification with participant schedules.
However, whether ATSIC will be able to administer such an income test
is an issue which takes us back to the question of administrative resources
and capabilities discussed in the previous section. Solving marginal
eligibility differences in an attempt to restore some broad equivalence
between CDEP and social security entitlements may simply once again
push ATSIC back into problems with this other range of issues.
Gender considerations
Although many of the marginal eligibility problems raised in the previous
section may seem of little substantial concern, there are eligibility
problems which raise questions of a more substantial policy nature. The
most long-standing of these has been the apparent ineligibility of
unemployed spouses of employed community members to participate in
the CDEP scheme, including, on some interpretations, the spouses of
CDEP workers. The reason for this is that such people do not fall within
the category of those who would normally be eligible for UB, or its
replacement, if the community did not have a CDEP.
The problem applies in principle to spouses of either sex. It has generally
been cast, however, as a problem of women being unable to participate in
the CDEP scheme because of working husbands (CDEP Working Party
1990: 47-50). Certainly the initial 1977 guidelines for the CDEP scheme
fell into the trap of using 'his', rather than 'their' or 'her' job for UB
entitlements and in the early stages of the scheme there was an
overwhelming tendency to see it in male terms. Since then, some latitude
has been developed in allowing communities to involve women, as well as
men, in working for their portion of entitlements, and even involving
supporting parents beneficiaries in the scheme. However, the underlying
problem still remains for spouses of those employed outside the CDEP
scheme. They are still ineligible for inclusion in the CDEP scheme
because of their ineligibility for a social security payment.
What constitutes work?
The issue of women's participation relates closely to another persistent
problem for the CDEP scheme over the years of its operation; what
constitutes work? In many of the remote Aboriginal townships where it
was first applied the male-oriented CDEP scheme tended to have a strong
public works/town maintenance orientation. Almost from the beginning
there was a challenge to this orientation which focused not only on
broadening women's participation in the scheme, but also on broadening
the guidelines of what constituted socially useful and acceptable work
under the scheme (Coombs et al. 1983: 263-4).
The trend was clearly to push for a wider definition of acceptable work,
including traditional economic and cultural activities like arts and crafts
manufacture and subsistence. This was particularly the case when the
scheme was applied to smaller outstation communities where hunting and
gathering activities make a significant contribution to the economic, as
well as the social and cultural well-being of residents (Altman 1985;
Altman and Taylor 1989). It was also the case when the scheme was
applied to island and coastal communities, where fishing was an important
activity both for community food supplies and for cash income
supplementation (Arthur 1991). In these contexts, it can legitimately be
argued that the CDEP scheme, if implemented as a public works-style
program, can actually lead to a diversion of work effort away from the
activities which are most socially and economically useful for Aboriginal
people in these communities. The introduction of the CDEP scheme has
been observed, in some instances, to lead to a decline in such activities
(Altman 1985; Stanley 1985; Altman and Taylor 1989; Arthur 1990).
The recognition of this problem led the Miller Committee, which
reviewed Aboriginal employment and training programs in 1984/85 and
thereby provided the basis for the Hawke Government's AEDP, to
recommend specifically that in relation to homeland/outstation
communities in remote areas, CDEP 'should be viewed as an on-going
form of cash support in recognition of traditionally based employment
and productive activities' (Miller 1985: 188, 352). This recommendation
manifested itself in the Hawke Government's commitment in the AEDP
Statement to implementing the CDEP scheme in such a way as:
to enable Aboriginal communities and groups to engage in artefact production, the
cultural teaching of the young and other traditional economic and cultural activities,
and receive income based on unemployment benefit entitlements for the work they
perform (Australian Government 1987a: 8).
Whether the CDEP scheme is now being allowed to operate along these
lines at the community level is a matter which needs empirical
investigation. The entrenched male-dominated public works orientation of
the CDEP scheme in many communities may not have been as easily
changed as the issuing of such directives. The debate about what
constitutes work is, in fact, far from being resolved entirely in favour of
those who would prefer a very broad definition. Indeed, in response to
suggestions put to the Australian National Audit Office during the course
of their 1990 investigation that in some communities the CDEP scheme
had virtually no work component, recommendations were made that
payment of grants under the scheme should be made dependent on the
preparation and implementation of a 'community plan'. Although such a
plan would not necessarily require a restricted definition of work, it may
create pressures to move in such a direction.
Supplementary or substitution funding?
The use of the CDEP scheme to support 'mainstream' municipal-type
services such as town and infrastructure maintenance has, as noted above,
been evident from the earliest days of its operation in remote Aboriginal
townships. Though long recognised, this has not always been seen as a
problem. Indeed, this use of CDEP funds was clearly endorsed by the
original guidelines for the scheme which envisaged that projects to be
undertaken would include 'economic ventures, town management
activities, social advancement and environment improvement1
(Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26
May 1977: 1922). A decade later the Hawke Government was equally
willing to endorse an 'increase in the range of activities' which could be
undertaken under the CDEP scheme to include 'a wider range of
municipal services provision projects' (Australian Government 1987a: 7).
The use of CDEP funds to support municipal-type services has, at one
level, clearly not been seen as an issue. However, there have also been
quite substantial criticisms made over the years that this has enabled both
the Aboriginal affairs portfolio and mainstream functional government
agencies to reduce their level of funding to remote Aboriginal
communities for municipal-type services in favour of CDEP. There is
certainly some evidence that this has been the case. 'Community
infrastructure' programs within the Aboriginal affairs portfolio fell from
around 25 per cent of the DAA's budget in the early 1970s to around 10
per cent in the early 1980s and presently stand at around 15 per cent. In
the review of Aboriginal communities in the Pitjantjatjara lands of South
Australia it was estimated that on average 44 per cent of actual CDEP
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wages were used to support mainstream functions (Bonner 1988: 138). In
some communities this percentage was as high as 81 per cent.
The Aboriginal affairs portfolio has always defended itself against
charges that it is using the CDEP scheme as substitution, rather than
supplementation, funding. In the early years the DAA argued that past
levels of funding for infrastructure and town maintenance had also
reflected employment creation goals, and could therefore legitimately be
reduced once the CDEP alternative existed in a community. In more
recent years the DAA has also defended itself by arguing that
responsibility for the funding of municipal-type services in Aboriginal
communities ultimately rests not with it, but, as for other Australian
communities, with mainstream State, Territory and local government
infrastructure organisations (DAA 1989: 137). It is they, so the argument
runs, not the Aboriginal affairs portfolio who are not meeting their
funding responsibilities.
The underlying problem here, as identified and discussed by the Miller
Committee (1985: 339-43), is that Aboriginal community councils in
remote townships have, over recent years, increasingly undertaken the
provision of a range of municipal infrastructure-type services, but
without having had access to mainstream funding for these services. The
strategic problem for the DAA has been how to withdraw from this area
of funding, thereby encouraging the mainstream State and local
government funding systems to take over, without leaving those
Aboriginal community councils with no funding support at all. The CDEP
scheme has provided part of the answer to that strategic problem for the
DAA and has in the process had to weather substantial criticism for being
a substitution funding source. It should be noted though that this is a
problem that is not limited to the CDEP scheme and can arguably be
developed in relation to much of the Commonwealth's Aboriginal affairs
portfolio expenditure. It has been argued elsewhere that all DAA (now
ATSIC) programs have elements of substitution funding that allow other
levels of government, and other federal government agencies, to renege
on their legitimate funding responsibilities (Altman and Dillon 1986;
Altman 1990).
Under-award wages: a secondary labour market?
A corollary to the observation that the CDEP scheme has been used to
support mainstream local government-type services, is that it has been
used effectively to relegate Aborigines, in what would otherwise be
regular primary labour market employment, to under-award and
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secondary labour market conditions (see Heppell and Wigley 1977: 87;
Coombs et al. 1983: 261-2). The DAA's early response to such criticisms
was to amend the guidelines for CDEP so as to insist that participants
were paid part-time pro-rata award rates for work that is similar to that
undertaken under an established industrial award. Communities have,
however, generally not complied with this direction. To quote the recent
Audit Office report "... wage rates under CDEP generally did not reflect
relevant award rates despite CDEP Guidelines requiring that they should1
(Auditor-General 1990: vii).
To quote one recent union commentary, "... most CDEP schemes
underpay their workers. The Unions are unhappy about letting a CDEP
truck driver or gardener get paid less than, say, a local council truck
driver or gardener' (Smith 1990: 4). This union perspective did,
however, continue by noting that there were 'significant benefits to
communities' from the CDEP scheme and that unions were reluctant to
'interfere with those benefits'. It also noted that Aboriginal organisations
tend more generally to pay their workers below what the unions consider
to be 'fair and reasonable wages and conditions' (ibid: 4).
The conclusion to be drawn from these observations about under-award
employment conditions would seem to be that the CDEP scheme
represents a more extreme form of a general phenomenon in many
Aboriginal communities. The vast majority of Aboriginal employees in
these communities work for under-award conditions, with the conditions
of CDEP workers being just the least generous. Only a few Aborigines in
these communities, if any in some, attain employment under primary
labour market conditions. This discrepancy is often quite dramatically
highlighted by the fact that conditions for non-Aboriginal employees in
these communities can sometimes include fringe benefits such as access to
vehicles, access to subsidised housing and generous holiday entitlements
which may include airfares to southern capital cities, as well as the more
usual primary labour market benefits, such as access to superannuation
schemes.
Capital and on-cost provision
Another problem for the CDEP scheme over the years has been access to
capital and on-cost provisions related to the employment projects being
undertaken. Recognition of this problem led at the outset of the scheme to
provision for additional grants to participating community councils for
the purchase of materials and equipment associated with work projects.
The original level of such grants was 10 per cent of the wages/UB
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component. However, under pressure from participating organisations
who were realising the need to meet other worker on-costs, such as
workers compensation insurance, this was raised to 20 per cent in 1983.
The AEDP in 1987 introduced a CDEP Support program which, although
not tied directly to a proportion of the scheme's wages component, added
about the same amount as on-costs again. Annual expenditures on the
CDEP Support program were anticipated to grow from $10 million in
1987/88 to $12 million in 1991/92 (Australian Government 1987a: 9).
Information in Table 2 indicates that since its first full year of operation
in 1988/89, the CDEP Support program has accounted for between 11
and 13 per cent of total expenditure on the CDEP scheme. Similarly, the
wages component (notional UB equivalent) proportion of the scheme's
cost has declined to between 73 and 74 per cent of its total cost.
Table 2. CDEP scheme expenditure ($ million) 1988/89 to
1990/91.
Year Wages On-costs Support Total
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
$73.101 (74%)
$97.517 (73%)
$144.060 (74%)
$14.583 (15%)
$19.176(14%)
$24.642 (13%)
$11.148(11%)
$16.554 (12%)
$25.388 (13%)
$98.832
$133.248
$194.091
Source: Economic Initiatives Branch, ATSIC.
The level of additional payments for capital and on-costs available under
the CDEP scheme, over and above the wages/UB component, is now quite
substantial and a considerable incentive for inclusion in the scheme.
Indeed Morony (1991) foresees that the relative disadvantage of
Aboriginal communities not on CDEP, but instead just receiving the
replacements for UB under the new Active Employment Strategy, may
become problematic in the future.
Income maximisation and long-term dissatisfaction
There is no doubt that the CDEP scheme has, over the years, been
enthusiastically embraced by Aboriginal communities and their councils.
One common scenario, however, is that, after an optimistic period when
the CDEP scheme is first introduced, a degree of community frustration
sets in, because part-time poorly paid employment based on the scheme's
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UB-equivalent wages pool is all that is available, year-in and year-out.
For example, the recent review of the Aboriginal arts and crafts industry
reports that batik producers at Ernabella expressed concern that they
could never graduate beyond low hourly wages ranging from $6.60 to
$8.50 (Altman 1989: 175). Similarly, a recent survey at a number of
remote communities by Smith et al. (1990: 44) reports that a high
proportion of Aboriginal participants in the CDEP scheme complain that
they 'can only look forward to a life of small money'.
Allowing CDEP incomes to be supplemented at an individual level by art
and craft sales or fishing sales or, at a group level, by using the CDEP
workforce to undertake work contracts, has some potential for addressing
this problem of longer term dissatisfaction with restricted income and
employment opportunities. However, as testing for additional income of
CDEP participants has been introduced by ATSIC to restore some
notional equivalence with social security entitlements, the ability and
incentives to do this have been considerably lessened.
Support for enterprises
The CDEP scheme does in many instances operate as a support scheme
for Aboriginal commercial enterprises. It does this primarily through
providing enterprises with an effective wage subsidy, though in some
instances its allowances for materials and equipment may also provide
working and other capital.
As an enterprise-oriented program, the CDEP scheme differs from other
ATSIC and DEET programs in a number of important ways. The funds
available for equipment and capital under CDEP are fairly slight and
unrelated to any assessment of an enterprise's needs or potential
commercial viability. The effective wage subsidy to an enterprise from
CDEP is on-going and provides no incentive to reduce program
dependence over time, as is common in other enterprise support
programs. In short the CDEP scheme gives all the wrong signals for
enterprise development; it provides an incentive structure which may
promote, rather than reduce, long-term dependence.
It should be noted in this context that there are a range of other enterprise
development programs within the AEDP which do include such
considerations in the provision of capital and wage support. For example,
the Enterprise Employment Assistance (EEA) program administered by
DEET provides wage subsidies (at a notional UB equivalent rate) to
enterprises for 12 months in most instances, but on a potentially longer
14
term basis for remote community-based enterprises. The EEA program
has many similarities to the CDEP scheme. It may be preferable to
modify the EEA program, specifically designed for enterprises, rather
than utilise the CDEP scheme to meet yet another objective.
Community self-management and individual rights
The introduction of the CDEP scheme into an Aboriginal community
facilitates the concentration of community authority over work and
income matters in the community council. Money which would have
flowed direct to individuals as social security entitlements, flows instead
via the community council. This increases the council's ability to control,
or at least in some way direct, the activities of community members, as
was clearly the intention of the scheme from the outset. This community
self-management aspect of the CDEP scheme has always been regarded as
one of its great strengths, rather than in any way an issue. Indeed, given
the centrality of the idea of 'self-management' to recent Federal
Government policy towards Aboriginal people, it may seem that on this
count the CDEP scheme is beyond criticism or reproach. However, the
reality behind the rhetoric of community self-management is often quite
complex, and the CDEP scheme does in fact raise questions about
weighing community self-management against the rights of individual
Aborigines.
In the 1960s and early 1970s most social security payments for which
Aborigines in remote areas were judged eligible were not paid directly to
the individuals concerned, but to third parties (usually missions,
settlement superintendents or pastoralists) on their behalf (Sanders 1986).
Pressure to change to more direct individual payments was considerable
and the pattern of third party payments was, like the DSS's practice of
regarding Aborigines in remote areas as ineligible for UB, only just
breaking down at the time of the introduction of the CDEP scheme.
Understandably then, there was considerable concern at that time that the
CDEP scheme may deny individual rights to social security entitlements.
This concern tended to decline once the CDEP scheme achieved its open-
ended budgeting arrangement in 1983. However, the issue has raised itself
anew in the last year or so as communities in the more settled areas of the
Australian continent have also become involved in the CDEP scheme. The
general solution here has been to insist that individual participation in a
CDEP in these areas, as well as community participation, is voluntary and
that individual eligibility for social security payments can exist in these
areas alongside participation by some in the community in CDEP.
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Community self-management and accountability
Another concern in recent years has been the public accountability of
Aboriginal community councils, or effective lack thereof, for the
expenditure of CDEP funds. Accountability for the expenditure of public
funds by community organisations has been of general concern within the
Aboriginal affairs portfolio in recent years and continues to be so today.
In the case of the CDEP scheme, however, ATSIC's ability to require
compliance from community councils has been particularly weak because
of the rapid expansion of the scheme and because of the strategic problem
that councils have been able to argue that they should not need to be held
accountable for the expenditure of what is, after all, an equivalent of the
social security entitlements of their community members. The contrary
argument is, of course, that this is an additional reason for thorough
public accountability for funds, as it needs to be publicly demonstrated
that individuals are in fact being given a chance to earn the equivalent of
their notional social security entitlement.
Concluding comment: prospects for resolution?
There is an increasing recognition in Aboriginal affairs that in many parts
of Australia where Aboriginal people reside there are very few
employment opportunities in mainstream labour markets (see Australian
Government 1987b). Given the intractable and structural nature of
Aboriginal unemployment, the attractiveness of the CDEP scheme is
understandable. From the Federal Government perspective, the fact that
participants in the scheme would otherwise be eligible for social security
payments make it especially attractive: while the scheme is not cost
neutral for government, its opportunity cost is relatively low.
As the above catalogue makes clear, however, the CDEP scheme abounds
with unresolved administrative and policy issues. Our suggestion, at the
outset, was that many of these problems spring ultimately from the
scheme's rather ambiguous position of being simultaneously both a
welfare and a workforce program. Prospects for the simultaneous
resolution of all these administrative and policy problems are, in our
judgement, very slim. Despite ATSIC's considerable present efforts, and
its great faith in the scheme, it is unlikely that the CDEP scheme will ever
be rid of many of these problematic ambiguities. Resolving one issue is
likely to exacerbate another and so throw the relative balance of income
support/welfare and employment development/workforce objectives in the
scheme back into question. This is not to say that these efforts are not
worthwhile, nor that the scheme itself is not important; it is simply to be
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realistic about the internal contradictions of the scheme and suggest that
some more fundamental effort needs to be invested in clarifying which of
these competing objectives is to take priority in the scheme.
Notes
1. This article has had a long gestation; it was originally completed in April 1991
prior to the abolition of the unemployment benefits regime and its replacement
from 1 July 1991 by Job Search Allowance (JSA) and Newstart. The terminology
in this discussion paper is contemporary and reference to unemployment benefits
is in the past tense. For many Aboriginal communities, in remote areas where
there is an absence of formal employment opportunities, these administrative
changes have made little difference to the nature of income support provision (see
Altman 1991).
2. It is important to note that there are some discrepancies in figures on participants
depending on the source used. These discrepancies are partly due to various
definitions of 'communities' and partly because some data refer to fiscal year of
commencement while others refer to calendar year.)
3. One of us (Altman) participated as a member of the Steering Committee for this
review.
4. In 1989/90, at the time of the freeze, there were 166 approved CDEP
communities, but a combination of some 'carryovers' and 'splintering' resulted in
169 communities participating in the scheme in 1990/91.
5 In the 1991/92 budget context, the Federal Government has provided additional
resources to ATSIC to expand the CDEP scheme by 4,600 participants over the
next three years, with 1,500 positions being for existing CDEP communities. In
1991/92, CDEP employment for 1,300 additional Aboriginal people will be
provided (800 new positions, 500 to existing CDEPs) at an estimated additional
cost of $2.9 million. The 1991/92 budget allocation for the CDEP scheme is $195
million ('Government moves to boost Aboriginal self-reliance', Media release,
Office of the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, 20 August 1991).
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